The EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In: International peacekeeping, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 544-560
ISSN: 1353-3312
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In: International peacekeeping, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 544-560
ISSN: 1353-3312
World Affairs Online
In: International peacekeeping, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 544-560
ISSN: 1743-906X
In: Journal of peace research, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 524
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: International peacekeeping, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 544-560
ISSN: 1353-3312
In: Journal of peace research, Band 40, Heft 5, S. 614-614
ISSN: 1460-3578
In: Journal of peace research, Band 40, Heft 5, S. 614
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: Contemporary security policy, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 197-210
ISSN: 1743-8764
World Affairs Online
UN peace operations need a new peacebuilding agenda that acknowledges both the transboundary nature of conflict drivers and the multipolar nature of the global order. This means casting aside the current stabilization approach, but also abandoning the pursuit of liberal peacebuilding of the unipolar era. Such a conflict transformation agenda would require UN peace operations to prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up approaches, thus creating the potential to be embraced by a much broader range of member states. In this article, we bring liberal peacebuilding critiques into a discussion with debates on the nature of the global order. Liberal peacebuilding critiques are rooted in the bottom-up problematization of international interventions and show what kind of peacebuilding is desirable. Conversely, the debates on the multipolar nature of the global order expose the top-down constraints as to what kind of peacebuilding is feasible. ; publishedVersion
BASE
This chapter analyses the EU's crisis response in the Western Balkans through the lens of EULEX. By exploring how those immediately responsible for mandate execution and those directly affected by its outcomes perceive EULEX, we discover gaps that highlight the pitfalls of direct and ingrained political interference in the mission's work. While EULEX has been seen as an important watchdog for preventing further human rights abuses, the EU's approach to Kosovo and the region continues to be characterised by competing priorities: the EU's broader political objectives impact the mission's legal work and hamper the EU in achieving a coherent and impactful rule of law policy. In turn, this decreases the local populations' trust and approval of EULEX and ultimately undermines the EU's overall goals of promoting good governance and a European perspective for Kosovo. This tension highlights the incompatibility of the EU's short-term focus on crisis management and the more longterm focus on crisis transformation. We see this as particularly problematic for an actor whose self-image as a 'normative power', is underpinned by an assumption that its influence in the world in gained through 'the power of ideas'. ; publishedVersion
BASE
This work was partially supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the UN Peace Operations Programme Grant (project number QZA-16/0426). ; UN peace operations need a new peacebuilding agenda that acknowledges both the transboundary nature of conflict drivers and the multipolar nature of the global order. This means casting aside the current stabilization approach, but also abandoning the pursuit of liberal peacebuilding of the unipolar era. Such a conflict transformation agenda would require UN peace operations to prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up approaches, thus creating the potential to be embraced by a much broader range of member states. In this article, we bring liberal peacebuilding critiques into a discussion with debates on the nature of the global order. Liberal peacebuilding critiques are rooted in the bottom-up problematization of international interventions and show what kind of peacebuilding is desirable. Conversely, the debates on the multipolar nature of the global order expose the top-down constraints as to what kind of peacebuilding is feasible. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed
BASE
Recent years have seen important developments regarding the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat. The Security Council, which has increasingly recognized organized crime as a serious threat to international peace and security—especially in relation to terrorism—has begun using sanctions to deal with organized crime and trafficking in Mali and Libya. Further, serious and organized crime (SOC) police units have been established in several UN field operations, including in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali. However, there is still no UN-wide policy on organized crime, and the issue has been conspicuously absent from recent strategic documents such as the Action for Peacekeeping Declaration (A4P). This report argues that there is need for a UN system-wide approach to peace operations for preventing and addressing organized crime, and its links to terrorism. To achieve this, UN member states and the UN Secretariat should seek to consolidate and broaden its nascent law enforcement capacity- building police approach into a context sensitive, system-wide approach. Six specific recommendations for the way forward are offered. ; publishedVersion
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In: European security, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 493-512
ISSN: 1746-1545
This contribution increases the understanding of the EU's role in post-conflict settings by exploring perceptions of EULEX by local rule of law experts. Drawing on critical peacebuilding and the decline of normative power Europe literatures, we develop an analytical framework, underlining the importance of the intention–implementation gap and the implementation–perception gap in understanding how EU missions are perceived. By comparing local expert narratives to those of EULEX judges, prosecutors, and legal officers, we contend that the core problem for the negative perception of the mission results from what we call the double proximity paradox in peacebuilding. The first paradox is one of implementation and transpires when an actor commits substantial resources to address structural problems in a post-conflict territory due to its centrality for its own interests, but fails to uphold its commitment as its immediate interests can only be achieved through agents who contribute to these problems. The second paradox relates to perception and transpires as high commitments raise expectations of structural impact. The visibility of the actor's investment makes any implementation failures more tangible. The actor is therefore, paradoxically, the most open to criticism in a territory where it is doing the most. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed
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In: International peacekeeping, Band 23, Heft 5, S. 784-803
ISSN: 1743-906X
In: International peacekeeping, S. 1-20
ISSN: 1380-748X